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MODERN TRENDS IN TRIAL BY JURY
ALEXANDER HOLTZOFF*

Trial by jury is one of the outstanding contributions to jurisprudence made by the English common law. The basic concept of the
participation of the public in the administration -of justice had not
been entirely unknown. It had previously existed in various forms,
as for instance in ancient Athens.' The novel features of the English
jury system consisted of the selection of a small specified number of
laymen taken temporarily from the community to sit under the
guidance of permanent professional judges from whom the jury received instructions and advice; of the requirement of unanimity; and
of the .cooperation of the jurors and the judge, each performing different functions leading to a determination of the controversy presented
for decision.
The common law jury as it developed in England is thus characterized by a number of essential features. The first is that the jury is
composed of a small specified number of members, the historic figure
being twelve. The second is that the decision of the jury must be
unanimous. Unanimity is important and vital, for two reasons: first,
it leads to a more thorough consideration of the questions at issue and
a more careful deliberation in the jury room than might otherwise
be the case, since debate and discussion must continue until a unanimous verdict' is reached; and second, the fact that the verdict is
unanimous is in itself strong assurance of its fairness and justice. The
only possible drawback to the requirement of unanimity is that occasionally it leads to a deadlock and thereby requires re-trial before
another jury. The percentage of cases in which this happens in juris*United States District Judge for the District of Columbia, 19 45 --date. A.B.,
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dictions in which the common law system still prevails is, however,
not sufficiently large to constitute an important factor.
The next inherent feature is that the jury decides only issues of
fact, while the judge rules on all questions of law. The final cardinal
characteristic of the common law trial by jury which is of utmost importance is that at the end of the trial the judge instructs the jury.
While the American terminology is that the judge "instructs" or
"charges" the jury, the English phrase is that the judge "sums up the
case" or "directs the jury." His instructions are binding on the jury
as to the law. The jury must apply the rules of law laid down by the
judge to the facts it finds. In addition to instructing the jury on the
law, the judge performs an additional function at the same time. He
advises the jury as to the facts, that is, he points out the issues of fact,
summarizes the salient evidence on both sides and possibly comments
on specific items of evidence. He may even express his opinion, if he
deems it wise to do so, as to the weight or effect of any part of the
testimony and even as to the ultimate issue to be determined by the
jury. He must make it clear, however, that his discussion of the evidence is not binding, but merely advisory, and that the jury is to be
the final judge of the facts. Thus the jury does not sit as a group of
arbitrators deciding the issues in controversy in accordance with its
own view of substantial justice, but reaches its decision under the
guidance of the judge as to the law and with the help of the judge's
advice as to the facts. All of these features in combination account
for the success of trial by jury over the centuries.
The common law concept of the judge's function in connection
with instructing the jury has been formulated in various ways by
famous English commentators. Sir Matthew Hale, in language that
today seems quaint, stated that it was the function of the trial judge
in matters of fact to give the jury "great light and assistance by his
weighing the evidence before them and observing where the question and knot of the business lies, and by showing them his opinion
even in matters of fact, which is a great advantage and light to laymen." 2 Blackstone enunciated a similar thought as follows:3
"When the evidence is gone through on both sides, the
judge, in the pretence of the parties, the counsel, and all others,
sums up the whole to the jury; omitting all superfluous circumstances, observing wherein the main question and principal
issue lies, stating what evidence has been given to support it,
2Hale, History and Analysis of the Common Law of England
' 3 Blackstone, Commentaries "375.

259.
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with such remarks as he thinks necessary for their direction,
and giving them his opinion in matters of law arising upon that
evidence."
These doctrines are so much a part of the warp and woof of the
common law and are deemed to be of such an elementary nature that
there are comparatively few English judicial decisions dealing with
this subject. In one case, however, it was observed that "it is no objection that a judge lets the jury know the impression which the evidence has made upon his own mind." 4 In another case Lord Tenterden stated that "we are all, however, agreed, that notwithstanding I
did intimate to the jury my opinion upon the subject, yet as I left it
to them to exercise their own discretion, and to draw their own conclusion from the evidence, we ought not to disturb this verdict....,5
Passing to more recent expressions of this doctrine, in Rex v.
O'Donnell6 the Court of Criminal Appeal stated:
"[Als this Court has said on many occasions ... a judge, when
directing a jury, is clearly entitled to express his opinion on the
facts of the case, provided that he leaves the issues of fact to the
jury to determine. A judge obviously is not justified in directing a jury, or using in the course of his summing up such
language as leads them to think that he is directing them, that
they must find the facts in the way which he indicates. But he
may express a view that the facts ought to be dealt with in a
particular way, or ought not to be accepted by the jury at all.
He is entitled to tell the jury that the prisoner's story is a remarkable one, or that it differs from accounts which he has
given of the same matter on other occasions. No doubt the
judge here did express himself strongly on the case, but he left
the issues of fact to the jury for their decision, and therefore
this point also fails."
A late English formulation of this principle is found in Halsbury's
Laws of England,7 which contains the following remarks on the subject:
"After the close of the reply of the counsel for the prosecution, or if there is none, after the final speech of the defendant
or his counsel, the presiding judge sums up the whole case and
the evidence to the jury and gives his direction on the matters
in issue and on the points of law applicable to these matters....
"A judge must leave the facts for the jury to decide and
should not invite the jury to make a particular finding, though
he is entitled to express his views strongly."
'Davidson v. Stanley, 2 Man. & Gr.'721, 728, 133 Eng. Rep. 936, 939 (1891).
rSolarte v. Melville, 7 B. & Cress. 430, 435, io8 Eng. Rep. 784, 785 (1827).
812 Cr. App. Rep. 219, 221 (1917).
7io Halsbury, The Laws of England §§ 779-80 (ad ed. 1955).
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The American colonists brought the common law jury with them
to this continent. The Founding Fathers were profound scholars.
They were thorough students of history and law. It was their desire
to preserve and perpetuate the private rights to which Englishmen
had been accustomed. In fact, one of the grievances that led to the
American Revolution was the disregard by the English government
of the privileges of the colonists as Englishmen. One of these fundamental rights was trial by jury.
In order to safeguard this privilege and prevent any encroachment
upon it, it was provided in article III, section 2, clause 3,of the Constitution of the United States, that "the trial of all crimes, except in
cases of impeachment, shall be by jury." This provision was in effect
reiterated in the sixth amendment, which reads that "in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed." Constitutional sanction was accorded
to trial by jury in civil cases by the seventh amendment, which provides that "in suits at common law where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved."
These clauses of the Constitution of the United States have been
construed as not merely guarantying trial by jury generally, but as
perpetuating trial by jury in the form in which it was known at common law. Thus in United States v. Philadelphiaand Reading R.R.,8
trial by jury in the federal courts was defined in the following
language:
"Trial by jury in the courts of the United States is a trial
presided over by a judge, with authority, not only to rule upon
objections to evidence, and to instruct the jury upon the law,
but also, when in his judgment the due administration of justice
requires it, to aid the jury by explaining and commenting upon
the testimony, and even giving them his opinion upon questions of fact, provided only he submits those questions to their
determination."
The same thought was enunciated in Capital Traction Co. v. Hop
as follows:
"'Trial by jury,' in the primary and usual sense of the term
at the common law and in the American constitutions, is not
merely a trial by a jury of twelve men before an officer vested
a123

U.S. 113, 114 (1887).

p174 U-S. 1,i13 (1899).
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with authority to cause them to be summoned and empanelled, to administer oaths to them and to the constable in charge,
and to enter judgment and issue execution on their verdict; but
it is a trial by a jury of twelve men, in the presence and under
the superintendence of a judge empowered to instruct them on
the law and to advise them on the facts, and (except on acquittal of a criminal charge) to set aside their verdict if in his opinion it is against the law or the evidence."
Later, Chief Justice Hughes, in Quercia v. United States,10 likewise gave expression to the same principles:
"In a trial by jury in a federal court, the judge is not a mere
moderator, but is the governor of the trial for the purpose of
assuring its proper conduct and of determining questions of
law. [citation omitted.] In charging the jury, the trial judge is
not limited to instructions of an abstract sort. It is within his
province, whenever he thinks it necessary, to assist the jury in
arriving at a just conclusion by explaining and commenting
upon the evidence, by drawing their attention to the parts of it
which he thinks important; and he may express his opinion
upon the facts, provided he makes it clear to the jury that all
matters of fact are submitted to their determination. [citations
omitted.] ...Under the Federal Constitution the essential prerogatives of the trial judge as the), were secured by the rules of
the common law are maintained in the federal courts."
Expressions of these ideas in opinions of the federal courts are
legion. Two recent statements are typical. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit said in United States v. Rosenberg:"
"[U]nlike judges in many of our state courts, a federal judge
may comment outright on any portion of the evidence, telling
the jury how it struck him, whom he believed, or disbelieved,
and the like, provided only that he advises the jury that they
are in no way bound by his expressions of such views."
Similarly the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
12
stated in Stanley v. United States:
"The trial judge had a right to express his opinion to the jury
since he gave them clearly to understand that the jurors were
not bound by the judge's opinion, but were free to exercise
their own judgment."
Thus trial by jury as known at common law persists in its original
form in the English courts, as well as in federal courts in this country.
English judges seem at times more likely to review the evidence in
1289 US. 466, 469 (1933).
11195 F.2d 583, 594 (1952)2245 F.2d 427, 436 (1957).

32

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol.XVI

greater detail and are somewhat more emphatic in commenting on it
and in expressing their opinion than is true of some federal judges,
but in its essentials the same system prevails in both groups of tribunals.
An entirely different line of development, however, took place in
many of the states. In the early years of the Republic in many quarters
there was a popular distrust of judges inherited from some unfortunate experiences of the Colonists with Royal judges during the preRevolutionary era. Accordingly, some of the states began to curtail
the judge's power to comment on the facts. Some went so far as to deprive him of the authority to summarize and discuss the evidence at
all, but limited him to instructing the jury solely on the abstract principles of law, sometimes even imposing an additional restriction that
this be done solely in writing. This movement started in North Carolina in 179513 and in Tennessee in 1796,14 and it then spread unchecked to other states. The result was that very few of the states retained the common law concept of trial by jury. New Jersey and
Pennsylvania continued to adhere to it. New York and Vermont modified it only to the extent of precluding the judge from expressing any
opinion on the facts and on the weight of evidence. The remaining
sthtes may be divided into several groups. Some limited the judge
to instructing the jury solely on the law, a few even confining him to
giving such instructions in writing. Another group of states permitted
the judge to summarize the facts, but not to comment on them.' 5
Maryland was in an isolated position in that it empowered the jury
to decide both the facts and the law. The practical result has been
that in most state courts the jury became almost supreme and was at
times likely to decide cases in accordance with its own ideas of substantial justice rather than in compliance with the governing principles of law.
A mere series of abstract principles of law stated by the judge is
not always well understood, or practically applied by a group of
laymen, if the judge is shorn of the power to discuss the facts and the
evidence which must be measured by these rules. It is sometimes customary to speak of the right of the judge to discuss the facts and
comment on the evidence. It should be better called the authority or
power of the judge. It is the jury that has the right to receive the
advice and assistance of the judge. It is the jury that under the pre8N.Q. Gen. Stat. § i-i8o (1953).

1

Tenn. Gonst. art. 6, § 9.
WVanderbilt, Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration 224-5o (1949).
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vailing state system is deprived of the aid to which it was entitled at
common law. Necessarily, in such instances the judge is transformed
into not much more than a presiding officer or a moderator at the
trial, while the' jury tends to become sovereign. Extreme appeals of
advocacy are more likely to sway or to have an undue effect on the jury
under these circumstances, because it lacks the guidance and the
stabilizing influence of the judge. Such criticisms as have been
directed against the jury system generally relate to trials in the state
courts and are due very largely to these circumstances.
The judge's discussion of the evidence is intended to assist the
jury and thereby to'aid it in arriving at a just result. It tends to clarify
the issues, to enable the jury to discard extraneous matters that are
at times injected into a trial, and to concentrate and focus the attention of the jury on the crucial points of the case. The judge is in
a position to place the various items of evidence in their proper setting and to restore them to their correct proportions, rather than to
permit them to remain in the distorted shape that at times they assume as a result of partisan presentation of counsel. On occasion the
judge's observations may assist the jury in resolving doubts or misgivings as to the weight to be accorded or the importance to be attached to some phase of the evidence.
The test of desirability of the common law procedure is whether it
is conducive to just verdicts and therefore aids in a proper administration of justice. This question answers itself. It is capable only
of an affirmative response. Counsel for the parties are permitted to
summarize the evidence and to comment on the facts from their
standpoint. Their presentation must of necessity be one-sided and
argumentative. The judge is the only impartial lawyer participating
in the trial and the only lawyer in a position to give unbiased
advice to the jury. It seems a paradox, therefore, to permit counsel to discuss the facts, but to bar the judge from doing so. It has
been said by an eminent federal judge that "it is always the right
of the federal judge to review and marshal the testimony, and it is
often his duty, for in no other way can he more effectively promote
the doing of justice."' 6
The only argument advanced against the common law procedure
is the contention that the judge's advice is likely to influence the jury
unduly. This objection was demolished by Chief Justice Taney in
17
the following manner:
"Graham v. United States, 12 F.2d 717, 718 (4th Cir. 1926).
'?Mitchell v. Harmony, ig U.S. (13 How.) 420, 424 (1851).
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"Nor can it be objected to upon the ground that the reasoning
and opinion of the court upon the evidence may have an undue
and improper influence on the minds and judgment of the
jury."
One of the most experienced jurists of our time, who for many
years had been a trial judge before his elevation to the appellate
bench, Judge Learned Hand, observed that "the belief very commonly
held by judges that a jury is excessively subject to the judge's influence, my own experience at least did not bear out. I found them generally quite robust enough to form their own opinions independently
of any indications I might give them of mine."'Is In an earlier case,
Judge Hand remarked that "juries are not leaves swayed by every
breath."'19
Judge Goodrich in the language of a homespun philosopher had
occasion to make the following comment: 20 "Juries are not so likely
to get excited or inflamed by lawyers' talk as lawyers think they are."
Another important factor in respect to which there has been a departure in many states from the common law concept of a jury trial
is the abandonment of the rule of unanimity. In many states less than
a unanimous verdict is permitted in some cases. The purpose of
unanimity has already been discussed. The only reason for abrogating
the traditional rule is the avoidance of disagreements and the consequent necessity for new trials. In jurisdictions in which the judge has
not been shorn of his common law power, the percentage of disagreements is small and not a sufficiently significant factor to require a
change in the mode of administering justice.
Thus, it can be said that trial by jury as it exists in most of the
states today is no longer the trial by jury originated by the common
law and prevailing in England and in the federal courts. The differences are so marked as to lead to the conclusion that we are dealing
with two different types of trials, and with two different institutions,
when we refer to modern trial by jury in the United States. One, the
common law form prevailing in the federal courts and a few states;
and the other, that found in most of the states.
Some years ago, the American Bar Association undertook to lead a
campaign to reinstate the common law jury trial in the states by restoring to judges the power to instruct the jury and to advise it on
the facts and on the evidence. In 1938, the Section of Judicial Ad"United States v. Goldstein, x2o F.2d 485, 491 (1941).
"United States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646, 649 (1923).
2°Smith v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., I73 F.2d 721, 726 (1949).
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ministration of the American Bar Association, under the chairmanship of Judge John J. Parker, appointed several committees to make a
study of judicial procedure with a view to suggesting needed reforms
and formulating standards that might serve as guides to those interested in improving the administration of justice. One of these
groups was a Committee on Trial Practice, of which Judge Calvin
Chesnut was Chairman. In its report the Committee discussed in some
detail the proper function and authority of the trial judge. It made
21
the following recommendations:
1. That the- common law concept of the function and
authority of the trial judge be uniformly restored in the states
which have departed therefrom.
2. That after the evidence is closed and counsel have concluded their arguments to the jury, the trial judge shall instruct the jury orally as to the law of the case, and he may advise the jury as to the facts by summarizing and analyzing the
evidence and commenting upon the weight and credibility
of the evidence or upon any part of it, always leaving the final
decision on questions of fact to the jury.

At its annual meeting, the Section of Judicial Administration ap22
proved these recommendations and adopted them verbatim.
In 1946 at the annual meeting of the American Bar Association
held in Atlantic City, the Section of Judicial Administration conducted a symposium on "The Right of a Judge to Comment on the
Evidence in his Charge to the Jury," and passed a series of resolutions
similar in tenor- to those adopted in 1938.23 In 195o, a Committee of

the Section of Judicial Administration, of which this writer had the
honor of being Chairman, submitted a report on the subject of instructions to jurors, bind recommended that active efforts be made to
achieve the standards previously adopted by the American Bar Association. This report was approved at the Annual Meeting of the
Section.
The leadership of the American Bar Association in this matter has
not proved as productive of results as had been hoped, although some
advances have been made. Elsewhere, active endeavors are in progress to further similar objectives. California, Michigan and Wisconsin have restored this authority to their trial judges, although the
writer is informed that it has not as yet been widely used in those
2Vanderbilt, Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration 538 (1949). The
report is set out in full. Id. at 536-44.
2Vanderbilt, op. cit. supra note 15, at 5o6.
06 F.R.D. 317-39.
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states. 24 There has been some agitation in some of the other states to
adopt this much needed reform.
The jury system has been the subject of many encomiums. Alexis
de Tocqueville, the great French observer of American institutions,
made the following challenging comments on this subject over a
25
century ago:
"The jury system as it is understood in America appears to me
to be as direct and as extreme a consequence of the sovereignty
of the people as universal suffrage. They are two instruments
of equal power, which contribute to the supremacy of the
majority....
"The jury contributes powerfully to form the judgment and
to increase the natural intelligence of a people; and this, in my
opinion, is its greatest advantage. It may be regarded as a
gratuitous public school, ever open, in which every juror learns
his rights, enters into daily communication with the most
learned and enlightened members of the upper classes, and becomes practically acquainted with the laws, which are brought
within the reach of his capacity by the efforts of the bar, the
advice of the judge, and even the passions of the parties. I think
that the practical intelligence and political good sense of the
Americans are mainly attributable to the long use that they have
made of the jury in civil causes."
From a practical standpoint trial judges and trial lawyers, who
have come in constant contact with trials by jury, have invariably been
of the opinion that as a means of administering justice and arriving
at just dispositions of both criminal and civil cases, the jury system has
been an outstanding success.
A noted English barrister, the Earl of Birkenhead, made the following illuminating remarks concerning his experience with juries: 2 6
"I suppose I was employed in litigation for nearly twenty
years, and very largely in jury cases. I cannot remember, in the
thousands of cases which I suppose I must have argued before
juries, more than three in which I was absolutely certain that
the juries were completely wrong. And even in these three the
value of my judgment is diminished by the fact that I was an
advocate."
Sir Patrick Hastings, who in his day attained renown as a trial
lawyer, expressed similar views: 27
2Cal. Pen. Code § 1127. Mich. Ct. Rules 37 § 9. See also a survey conducted by
James C. Toomey, Director of State Committees of the Section of Judicial Administration, summarized in Report of Director of State Committees, August 1956..
Wide Tocqueville, Democracy in America 283-85 (Reeve transl. rev. ed. 1945).
21 Birkenhead, Law, Life and Letters 255 (1927).
r,'Hastings, Cases in Court go.
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"An English jury is the foundation stone of English justice.
The ordinary juryman knows nothing of Law, and is not very
greatly concerned with the stricter rules of evidence, but he
possesses -a positive genius for arriving at the truth-possibly because no lawyer is ever required to sit upon a jury. After a not
inconsiderable experience, I cannot personally remember one
single instance in which a jury have been wrong; I have often
been annoyed at their verdict, and may have recognized it as
one which no lawyer could have given, but on thinking the
matter over at a later date, I have invariably come to the conclusion that they were right... [O]f the many hundreds of
juries I have. faced there is not one that has not left behind a
feeling of deep admiration; for that reason alone it would be
ungrateful not to pay some slighi tribute to their memory."
Judge Chesnut in his 1938 report,; to which reference has been
made, expressed a similar opinion in a somewhat different form: 28
"Criticism of juries in federal courts is comparatively rare.
There the common law function of the trial judge is firmly
I
established ....
The writer shares these views. It has been his day to day observation in the trial of cases that juries perform their duties seriously and
conscientiously as well as intelligently. The composite product of
the twelve jurors is generally superior to the average of the twelve. In
a vast majority of cases the jury does substantial justice. Contrary to
a general impression, that sometimes is found even among members
of the bar, juries are not easily influenced or readily swayed by emotion, sympathy, passion or prejudice. Neither are they affected by
minor episodes that occasionally occur, or side issues that sometimes
arise during a trial. Ordinarily, juries can be trusted to set to one
side all irrelevant and inconsequential matters, to focus their attention on the main issues presented for their decision, and to decide
them impartially and fairly. This is particularly true in the federal
courts, where the judge is in a position in his instructions to the jury
to point out the issues of fact and summarize the evidence, thereby
directing and concentrating the jury's attention on the precise matters
presented for its determination. Juries often show remarkable discernment and an almost occult and uncanny ability to differentiate
between numerous issues presented to them, even in complicated cases
involving multiple defendants and counts. To be sure, like all other
human beings, jurors occasionally err. It has been this writer's observations, however, that the percentage of errors or miscarriages of
2Vanderbilt, op. cit. supra note 21, at 537-
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justice in jury trials is very small. It is not practicable to say that the
percentage of mistakes on the part of juries is any greater than that
on the part of judges. In criminal cases such errors when they do
occur are likely to be on the side of acquitting the guilty rather than
convicting the innocent. The latter result is rare indeed.
Some of the criticisms directed against jury trials are not well
founded. They generally emanate from persons who have had little
or no practical experience or actual contact with jury trials. Insofar
as they are justified, they generally relate to trials in the courts of
those states in which juries are bereft of the guidance of the trial judge
and are required to embark in a rudderless vessel on an unchartered
sea. Such defects can be met by restoring to state judges the power
to instruct and advise the jury as at common law.
Although the efficacy of jury trials is recognized as much as ever,
nevertheless, there has been a decline in the use of this mode of trial
in some places and in certain types of actions. In England trial by jury
has been reduced to a minimum in civil cases. Since England has no
written constitution, the privilege of trial by jury is not safeguarded
as an inviolate right, and its use is subject to the control of the courts.
In civil litigation trial by jury regularly prevails in England today
only in actions for libel and slander. Other civil suits are tried by
the court without a jury. The explanation sometimes advanced for
drawing a line of demarcation in this respect between actions for
defamation and other civil cases, is that the former relate to reputation, whereas the others affect only money or other property. It must
be observed that in England libel and slander are regarded as a much
more serious matter than is often true in the United States. It is felt
in England that an action affecting one's reputation is of such importance as to warrant trial by jury. On the other hand, in England
personal injury suits, which today form the bulk of civil litigation, are
invariably tried by the court without a jury. The advantage of this
drastic change lies in its increased efficiency by shortening the duration of the trial. In England less than a day is generally consumed by
the trial of an average personal injury case. It is obvious what benefit
can be derived by this manner of disposing of a crowded docket.
On the other hand, in criminal cases the right to a jury trial is still
preserved in England. A few years ago a procedure was introduced,
however, whereby a defendant in a criminal case may waive trial by
jury and consent to be tried by a magistrate in the police court. This
is frequently done, at least in London, where so-called "stipendiary
magistrates" are generally men of learning and stature that would
qualify them to sit on a higher court.
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Some of the provinces in western Canada have in recent years
followed the English tendency of doing away with jury trials in
civil actions.
In the United States, trial by jury has been preserved to a much
greater extent than in the mother country. Here both civil and criminal cases are generally so tried. Ordinarily it is impossible to abolish
jury trials except by consent of the parties, in view of the fact that
the Constitution of the United States and most state constitutions
preserve the right to this mode of trial: Neither the legislative branch
of the government, nor the courts under the rule-making power can
abrogate or abridge this privilege. Thus, personal injury cases still
continue to be tried by juries in most- of the states as well as in the
federal courts. This is likewise true of criminal cases. There seems
to be a feeling at the bar in this country that trial by jury should be
preserved. Certain encroachments on this mode of trial have been
made, however. There is a class of personal injury actions that are
regularly tried in the federal courts without a jury. This group comprises tort actions in which the United States is a defendant, because
the Federal Tort Claims Act, by which the United States waived its
immunity to suit in respect to tort claims, attached as a condition
to the waiver that in such cases the trial should be without a jury.29
In view of the numerous ramifications of the activities of the federal
government, there are many such suits, the great majority of them
arising out of accidents involving government vehicles. Thus, in the
fiscal year ending June 3o, 1958, 1216 cases were filed in the federal
courts under the Federal Tort Claims Act.30 While no doubt a large
proportion of them will eventually be disposed of without a trial,
those that remain to be tried will be heard without a jury. Experience
shows that because* of this circumstance a trial under the Federal
Tort Claims Act usually takes a much shorter time than is true of
private tort cases. There has been no complaint, so far as this writer
is aware, .against this mode of trial of tort suits against the United
States, nor has there been any suggestion that judges are less liberal
than jurors, either in passing on the issue of liability, or in ascertaining the amount of damages.
The writer is informed that in Louisiana a practice has arisen, more
or less by common consent, to waive jury trials in a great many actions for personal injuries. The explanation of this local usage is
Stat. 589 (1954), 28 US.C. § 2402 (Supp. III, 1956).
a°Report of Administrative Office of the United States Courts pp. I-i to 18, Sept.
1958.
268
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that under the Louisiana law, appellate courts may pass on the weight
of evidence and that, therefore, a judge's decision is subject to a
review on the facts as well as on the law. It is said that this practice
operates successfully.
In criminal cases, an interesting local practice has grown up in
Maryland. For a great many years it has been customary in the city
of Baltimore to waive jury trials in criminal cases. The result is that
in Baltimore, considerably over go per cent of all criminal cases are
tried without a jury. To some extent the same practice prevails in
the rest of the state, although there the percentage of cases tried
by the court alone is somewhat lower.
The practice of waiving jury trials in the federal courts is on
the increase in some districts. For example, at one time this writer was
temporarily sitting by assignment in the Eastern District of Michigan,
and found that in about 6o per cent of the criminal cases that came
before him for trial, there was a waiver of a jury and a consent to
trial by the court. To take another instance, in the District of Columbia such waivers are not uncommon. Not long ago the writer tried a
case of murder in the first degree, in which there were two defendants, both of whom not only waived a jury trial, but even insisted
and urged that the court accept the waiver, which the court felt in
duty bound to do. Recently there has been a tendency to waive jury
trials in criminal cases in which the defendant relies solely on the defense of insanity.
One of the methods recommended for accelerating congested dockets in metropolitan centers is the abolition of jury trials in personal
injury actions, which have been clogging the calendars. It has been
urged that jury trials constitute a luxury that we must forego in order
to manage the mounting volume of tort litigation. One proposal involves a substitution of trial by the court without a jury. In the federal
courts and in most states this end can be attained only by a constitutional amendment, or by the consent of the parties in individual cases.
Another proposal is more drastic. It has been suggested that an administrative tribunal be created to award damages in automobile
accident cases on a compensatory basis, without regard to negligence.
Such a scheme would be similar to the method of adjusting compensation in Workmen's Compensation cases. Every motorist then would
be required to carry insurance or perhaps contribute to a fund out of
which compensation would be. paid. The shortcoming of such a plan
is that as the award of damages would not be based on negligence
but would be more or less automatic, in many cases adequate compensation would not be received for pain and suffering or for the
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results of serious permanent injuries. Moreover, to permit administrative bodies forming a part of the executive branch of the government, to pass on personal civil controversies, might well be deemed
an encroachment on the tri-partite division of government and an infringement on the jurisdiction of the judicial branch.
One may inquire why lawyers do not waive jury trials if by this
means trials can be shortened and cases can be reached for final disposition faster than is true in some metropolitan centers today. It
would seem that it should be of interest to counsel representing plaintiffs to do so. The explanation often advanced by lawyers who specialize in practice on the plantiff's side in personal injury cases is that
juries are likely to be less rigid in enforcing the doctrine of contributory negligence than is often true of judges. It is sometimes said that
jury trials would be frequently waived and trials by the court alone
accepted, if the doctrine of contributory negligence were abolished
and the rule of comparative negligence were substituted, particularly in
jurisdictions where the judge is clothed with his common law powers.
The doctrine of contributory negligence, if rigidly applied, frequently leads to unjustified results, in that it absolves the defendant
from all liability irrespective of the fact that he may have been negligent and even grossly negligent. Some amelioration in the hardships
of this rule has been introduced by the doctrine of the last clear
chance which, however, may on occasion be equally unjust in respect
to defendants. Under the last mentioned doctrine a defendant may
be held liable irrespective of how negligent the plaintiff may have
been, and in what degree he may have contributed to the accident.
The doctrine of comparative negligence seems to hold the scales even
between the parties. In the federal courts it operates successfully in cases under the Federal Employers' Liability Act and the Jones Act. It
has likewise met with considerable success in several of the states. Many
far-sighted persons are urging its adoption elsewhere. If accepted it
may have a considerable effect on the extent to which resort will continue to be hadto jury trials in negligence actions.
Trial by jury has been a magnificent and a cherished institution.
What the future holds in store for it is shrouded in mystery. It is
indeed within the realm of possibility that those who seek to eliminate
it partially in civil cases in order to expedite the disposition of litigation may be successful. Whether this is likely to happen is, however,
highly speculative and problematical. In any event, we must strive to
restore trial by jury in the state courts to its common law form, in
order to enable juries to render the best possible service to the administration of justice.
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THE OBSOLESCENT LAW OF LARCENY*
ARTHUR L. GOODHARTt

On frequent occasions in the past this Review has urged that
the law concerning larceny, larceny by a trick, embezzlement, false
pretences, and other forms of dishonesty by which the property belonging to another can be acquired, should be reconsidered, and that
a simplified law of theft on the Continental model should be substituted for the forest of provisions in which it is so easy to lose one's
way. It is only fair, however, to point out that there are three things
which can be said in favor of the present chaos. The first is that it
gives the ingenious but dishonest rogue a sporting chance to get away:
with any luck he may find a legal loophole through which he can
escape. The second is that it gives the teacher of law an excellent
means by which to test the memory of his students because a detailed
knowledge of the precedents, frequently distinguished although in
fact indistinguishable, is essential here. As these cases are based on
legal fictions, invented by the judges for the laudable purpose of doing
justice when the strict law would lead to an undesirable result, it is
hardly surprising that ordinary reasoning is more of a hindrance than
a help in trying to understand them. The third argument in favour
of the present law is that it has given the critics of the legal profession, from the time of Bentham to the present day, an obvious example to advance in support of their allegation that lawyers are too
strongly wedded to the past and are prepared to follow an ancient
and outmoded rule merely because it is ancient. These three considerations must, of course, be given full weight when any change in the
law is proposed, but whether they furnish a sufficient justification for
the existing confusion may, perhaps, be open to doubt.
It is therefore most encouraging, if we may say so with respect, to
find that in Russell v. Smith [1958] i Q.B. 27, 31, Lord Goddard C. J.
*EDrroR's NoTE: This short article is reprinted from the April 1958 issue of The
Law Quarterly Review, in which it originally appeared as an unsigned Note. In
writing to the Editor, Professor Goodhart of Oxford, for permission to reprint, a
request was included to use the name of the author. In kindly granting the permission, Professor Goodhart said that he wrote this note, as well as all the other
unsigned notes in the L.Q.R. The April issue contained twenty of these notes, with
a subject matter that apparently covers the complete range of English law.
tProfessor Emeritus and Master of University College, Oxford, 195i-date;
Editor, Law Quarterly Review; K.B.E., Q.C.; Professor of Jurisprudence, Oxford,
1931-51.
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has quoted with approval the following "strong words" from Mr.
Rupert Cross's note ((1956) 72 L.Q.R. 183) on Moynes v. Coopper
[1956] 1 Q.B. 439: "[Such cases] are a public scandal both because
the courts ate reluctantly compelled to allow dishonesty to go unpunished, and because of the serious waste of judicial time involved
in the discussion of futile legal subtleties." The Lord Chief Justice concluded that "it would be a good thing, I think, if the law of larceny
could be somewhat simplified and cleared up."
The instant case contains some pretty legal subtleties. An information was preferred against the respondent S., a lorry driver, alleging that he hid stolen certain sacks of meal, the property of C., Ltd.
When S. collected a ton of feeding stuffs from C., Ltd., to deliver to
J., Ltd., an extra batch of eight sacks was loaded on his lorry in error.
S. did not know of this mistake until he discovered it when unloading
at the premises of J., Ltd., and he then decided to keep the eight
extra sacks for himself. The justices dismissed the information as they
were of the opinion that the "taking" of the eight additional sacks took
place'at the time of the loading, and that at that time S. did not have
the intent permanently to deprive the owner thereof. On ordinary
grounds of common sense there is obviously much to be said in favour
of this conclusion, as it seems to be impossible to distinguish the eight
excess sacks from the rest of the load. Which eight sacks did S. not
intend to receive at the time of the loading? Were they the last eight
sacks which were loaded, or were they the eight sacks which he finally
retained when he found that an excess number had been loaded?
Similarly, which eight sacks did the C. Co. not intend to load on the
lorry? On appeal the Divisional Court held that there had been a
taking and that .the case must go back to the magistrates with a
direction to convict. Lord Goddard C.J. analysed in his judgment
the various precedent cases and reached the conclusion that the decision in R. v. Hudson [1943] K.B. 456 must be followed. He held
that the respondent did not know what he had in the lorry until he
'found that he had eight sacks too many. "He was never intended to
have eight sacks too many and he never intended to take eight sacks
too many" (p. 34). It would obviously be possible to argue with equal
force that the respondent intended to receive all the sacks that were
loaded on his lorry even though an error in the number of sacks was
made. The Lord Chief Justice continued: "I do not think that a man
can take into his possession, or come into possession of, a thing of
which he has no knowledge .... If the respondent did not know that
the goods were there, how can he be said to be in possession of them?"
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On the other hand, in Hibbert v. McKiernan [1948] - K.B. 142 it was
held that the members of a golf club have possession of balls which
have been lost by individual players even though the members can have
had no knowledge of "the position or number of balls that might be
lying on their property" (Lord Goddard C.J., p. 15o). In the present
case the respondent had no knowledge of the number of sacks but it
seems reasonable to suggest that he intended to exercise control over
all the sacks on his lorry. Justice was obviously done in both cases,
but it is not markedly easy to reconcile them. They both, however,
strongly support the Lord Chief Justice's plea that the law should be
"somewhat simplified." One way by which this could be accomplished
in large part would be to get rid of the whole doctrine of possession
as it relates to the law of theft.
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